We study a natural experiment in the Indian mutual funds sector that created a 22 month period in which closed-end funds were allowed to charge an arguably shrouded amortized fee whereas open-end funds were forced to charge standard entry loads. We find that allowing closed-end funds to charge the shrouded type of fee led to a proliferation of closed-end funds in the market; 45 new closed-end funds were started over this 22 month period collecting 9.1 billion $U.S, whereas only two closed-end funds were started in the 66 months prior to this period collecting .42 billion $U.S., and no closed-end funds were started in the 20 months after this period. We argue that other theoretical determinants of the closed versus open ended organizational form did not change discretely around the natural experiment and thus are unlikely to explain the sudden emergence and disappearance of closed-end funds. We find closed-end funds did not perform better in terms of raw or risk-adjusted returns. If all the investors in closed-end funds during this period had invested in the lower fee open fund variety instead they would have paid 4.25 percent less in fees over this 22 month period, equal to approximately 500 million dollars in extra fees.
Introduction
An important puzzle in investor behavior is the prevalence of high-fee investment vehicles that provide no benefits in terms of return performance. This puzzle applies to the popularity of actively managed mutual funds as described in Gruber (1996) and the popularity of high-fee index mutual funds . Two possible explanations exist. One is that high-fee funds offer some other unobservable benefits that investors find worth paying for. Possible benefits include compensation for brokers who lower investor search costs as in Hortacsu and Syverson (2004) , or "financial advice, customer service, and discounted access to complementary investment instruments" ). Another explanation is that investors ignore fees, and thus competition amongst mutual fund providers does not reduce prices to competitive levels (Gabaix and Laibson (2006) , Carlin (2009) ). Identifying which explanation is correct has important implications for financial regulatory policy. Under the explanation that high fee funds offer other benefits, regulation will not improve welfare. Under the explanation that investors ignore fees, however, policies to improve disclosure and educate investors could have important effects on investor welfare.
To what extent can public policy hasten the rate of investor learning regarding shrouded fees? Two recent studies have experimentally varied the presentation of investment fees while holding all other fund characteristics constant to test whether making fees less shrouded changes fund choice, and both find little evidence to suggest that changing the framing of fees has large impacts on investor decisions. Beshears et al. (2009) conducts an experiment with Harvard staff to determine whether investors respond differentially to statutory fund prospectuses versus the SEC's "Summary Prospectus." The SEC intended the Summary Prospectus, which is much shorter than a standard prospectus, to make salient the characteristics of each fund including fees. Interestingly, Beshears et al. (2009) find that whether subjects are presented with the Statutory Prospectus or the Summary Prospectus has no economically or statistically significant effect on fund choices.
They also find that receiving the Summary Prospectus does not change how subjects respond to sales loads. Choi et al. (2009) conduct a laboratory experiment to understand why investors do not minimize fees when choosing S&P 500 index funds. They also find that providing additional information on funds, such as a cheat sheet that summarizes fees or an explanation about what a index fund is, did not have a large effect on investors' choices. This paper is the first to use actual observational data on mutual fund flows, in conjunction with a natural experiment on a fee disclosure policy, to test whether shrouding and un-shrouding fee structures can have an impact on investor mutual fund choices. We study two law changes imposed by the Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI), India's financial market regulator (analogous to the SEC in the United States). The first law change occurred on April 4, 2006. SEBI mandated that closed-ended funds could only charge "initial issue expenses" and that open-ended funds could only charge entry loads. 1 The only difference between initial issue expenses and entry loads was that initial issue expenses could be amortized. To illustrate what amortization means in this context, suppose an investor subscribed to 100 rupees in a closed-end fund with a six percent amortized initial issue expense. Over the tenure of the closed-end fund (typically three years in the Indian context after which the fund would automatically convert to an open-ended fund), six rupees would be extracted from the net asset value of the fund. In practice, .0055 rupees would be extracted per day which is equal to six rupees divided by 1095 days (the number of days in three years). Throughout the paper we refer to the period before this law change, i.e. the period before April 4, 2006 as Regime 1.
Because initial issue expenses were to be taken out of the net asset value gradually, investors were unlikely to be able to distinguish changes in the net asset value from the decline in value associated with the initial issue expenses. In contrast, investors are more likely to be aware of entry loads because these are deducted in a lump sum fashion from the initial investment. 2 Furthermore, mutual fund advertisements for closed-end funds typically advertised a zero entry load and only described the initial issue expenses in the later pages of the offer document.
The second law change occurred on January 31, 2008; throughout the paper we refer to the period between the first and second law changes as Regime 2. SEBI announced that any closed-end fund started after that date would no longer be allowed to charge the amortized initial issuance expenses; instead they would have to charge entry loads. We refer to the period after the second law change, i.e. the period after January 31, 2008 as Regime 3. 3 We hypothesize that disallowing closed-end funds to charge the less salient initial issue expenses would reduce the incentive for mutual fund companies to create new closed-end funds. Because the law change did not forbid new closed-end funds from charging high entry loads, this hypothesis is not driven by a price-cap being imposed on closed-end funds, but only a change in the type of fee that could be charged.
Consistent with this hypothesis, we find that allowing closed-end funds to charge amortizable popular in the Indian market in the last 5 years. These closed-end funds are quite different from the closed-end funds typically studied in the finance literature as all of them did allow investors to retrieve their money at net-asset value at specific times throughout the year. Of the 21 closed-end funds we have liquidity period data on 5 offered daily redemption, 2 offered weekly redemption, 9 offered monthly redemption, 2 offered quarterly redemption, and 3 offered half-yearly redemption. The Indian closed-end funds were also not listed on secondary exchanges. This is in contrast to standard closed-end funds where funds can only be extracted by selling shares on the secondary market. Similar to standard closed-end funds, however, these funds did not allow any new money to enter the fund after the initial corpus was raised.
2 Our argument regarding the difference in salience between initial issue expenses and entry loads is similar to Barber et al. (2005) who contend operating expenses are less salient than entry loads.
3 To summarize, Regime 1 is the period before April 4, 2006 before the first law change. Regime 2 is the period from April 4, 2006 through January 31, 2008 between the two law changes as Regime 2. Regime 3 refers to the period after the second law change up until the present.
initial issue expenses led to a proliferation of closed-end funds in the market; 45 new closed-end funds were started during Regime 2, whereas only two closed-ended funds were started during Regime 1, and no closed-ended funds were started during Regime 3. The proportion of fund flow amounts to new closed versus open funds during Regime 2 was 43 percentage points higher compared to Regimes 1 and 3. Further, we find that, on average, closed-end funds charged 6 percent in initial issue expenses, whereas open-ended funds charged only 1.75 percent in entry loads. A fully rational theory of investor behavior is unlikely to explain this behavior because if investors rationally invested in closed-end funds during Regime 2 then they should also have rationally invested in closed-end funds during period 3 and paid high entry loads instead of initial issue expenses. The fact that no closed-ended funds were started after closed-end funds were forced to charge entry loads rather than amortizable initial issue expenses suggests that investors were not cognizant of the high initial issue expenses they were paying; otherwise fund companies could have charged six percent entry loads and gotten some investors to pay for them during Regime 3. 4 It appears that mutual fund companies realized that investors would not be willing to pay 6 percent entry loads for closed-end funds and thus stopped creating closed-end funds. We estimate investors paid an additional 4.25 percent in fees over this 22 month period. Closed end funds perform slightly worse in terms of raw or risk-adjusted returns, thus we find no evidence that investors received better performance for the higher fees that closed-end funds charged. If investors had directed their money towards openended funds instead of closed-ended funds during this period they would have saved approximately 500 million U.S. dollars in fees 5 .
We also examine alternative explanations for the rise and fall of closed-end funds over this period. We find no evidence that these law changes imposed a price ceiling on closed or open-ended funds. It is important to note that both initial issue expenses and entry loads had a price-cap of six percent during Regime 2. We discuss the alternative explanation that initial issue expenses were not shrouded, but that Indian investors have discount rates that make them prefer paying fees over time instead of as a one-time entry load. In order for this to explain the proliferation of closed-end funds during the period between these law changes investors would have to have discount rates 4 A number of newspaper articles and policy reports written at this time noted the increase in popularity of closedend funds after the imposition of Regime 2, and argued that fund companies did this with the intention of hiding fees. of approximately 244 percent per year. Finally, we show that other theoretical determinants of the open versus closed form, as described in Stein (2005) , did not change discretely around the natural experiment and thus are unlikely to explain the sudden emergence and disappearance of closed-ended funds.
An important advantage of the natural experiment we study here is that we are able to observe how firms respond to a regulation that attempts to make their fees more transparent. This paper is unique in that it evaluates an "unshrouding" policy and finds that the policy had a large effect in reducing the demand for the formerly shrouded product. 6 Based on this evidence alone it is not possible to determine whether this policy was welfare improving, because some of the consumers who paid high shrouded fees for closed-end funds may have switched to non-mutual fund products with similarly high shrouded fees such as endowment life insurance policies. Nonetheless, this evidence does suggest that a broad based program of regulating shrouded fees could have large effects on consumer behavior as theorized by Gabaix and Laibson (2006) . This paper complements the experimental work described previously because it allows us to observe how firms and consumers will respond to a real change in regulation. Prior experimental work is partial equilibrium in the sense that it shows only how consumers respond to new disclosure norms; outside the laboratory, however, firms may change their products to find other ways of shrouding fees. In addition, the natural experiment studied here has the advantage of involving substantial amounts of money and actual investor decisions. We find that the particular transparency initiative of forcing all funds to charge entry loads rather than amortized fees had large effects on the investment decisions of Indian individual investors. While prior experimental studies found that providing more transparent information did not cause investors to invest in lower fee alternatives, here we conclude that the second regulation imposed by the Indian regulator essentially eliminated higher-fee closed-end equity funds from the market. This paper also builds on Barber et al. (2005) , which argues that entry-loads are less shrouded than operating expenses by presenting evidence that U.S. investors learned to avoid entry-loads more quickly than operating expenses. The authors are not able to take advantage of any exogenous changes in entry-load or operating expenses, however, and thus one weakness of their results is that they cannot rule out alternative explanations regarding other services associated with these specific types of fees.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents background information on the Indian mutual fund industry. Section 3 describes the language and implementation of the law changes studied here. Section 4 describes the data sources used in the paper. Section 5 presents the empirical results. Section 6 discusses other important alternative explanations such as whether the law changes imposed any explicit price ceilings and other theoretical determinants of the closed versus open fund organizational form as suggested in Stein (2005) . Section 7 concludes.
The Indian Mutual Fund Industry
The first government-run mutual funds were established in India in 1963, but the sector was not As in the United States, a large portion of mutual fund sales comes through a network of thousands of mutual fund brokers throughout the country known as Individual Financial Advisors (IFAs) and distributors (Kamiyama, 2007) . 10 IFAs and distributors typically sell funds to investors that live close to them. A retail investor in India would typically invest in a mutual fund by approaching a distributor and choosing a fund in which to invest. If the investor chose to purchase 10 shares of XYZ fund, the distributor would collect one payment from the investor that included the cost of the shares, the entry load, and any issue expenses due upon initial purchase. The distributor would transfer this full amount to the mutual fund company that issued the shares, and the mutual fund company would then pay a commission to the IFA/distributor for selling the One important difference between the "closed" funds discussed in this paper and the closedend funds described in the large literature on closed-end funds in developed countries is that closedend funds in India over this period did not trade on a secondary market. The Indian closed-end funds allowed initial investors the ability to withdraw their money at net asset value, usually at a monthly frequency, but no new money could enter the fund after the initial offer period. Because of this limited liquidity feature provided to initial investors, mutual fund companies typically did not list their closed end funds on the stock-exchange. Furthermore, all of the closed-end funds studied here state in their initial prospectus that after three years they would automatically be converted into open-end funds.
Mutual Fund Fee Regulation
In this section, we describe the key mutual fund fee regulation changes that comprise the natural experiment. We refer to the period before 
Regime 1: Six Percent Price Ceiling on Initial Expenses of Creating a Mutual Fund Scheme
The baseline regulations of the mutual fund sector in India were set out in the document Securities and Exchange Board of India (2009). This document indicated that mutual funds could charge special fees during the new offer period provided that initial expenses of floating the scheme shall not exceed six percent of the initial resources raised under that scheme and such expenses shall be accounted in the books of account of the scheme as specified in the Tenth Schedule."
An important feature of Regime 1 was that funds could amortize the fees collected as initial issue expenses. Suppose a fund raised 1000 rupees during the new fund offer period and charged six percent as initial issue expenses. The fund company would then have the right to take 60 rupees out of the fund as initial issue expenses over the first three years of the fund. Note that this was true for both open and closed-ended funds, i.e. the initial issue expense percentage rate only applied to the amount of money raised during this initial offer period. It did not apply to money that later entered an open-ended fund after the initial offering period. Typically funds would take these initial issue expenses out of the fund spread over the first three years of the fund as a way to artificially inflate the net asset value that was reported to investors. During Regime 1, there was also an important re-distributional feature of the amortization policy. Suppose after 1 year an investor took 500 rupees out of the fund. In Regime 1, this investor would only pay 20 rupees in initial issue expenses. If a second investor purchased shares from that initial investor and waited two more years until the fund was automatically converted to an open-end fund he would have to pay the remaining 40 rupees in initial issue expenses. Thus the amortization policy in Regime 1 allowed mutual funds to charge initial issue fees in a way that made long-term investors cross-subsidize short-term investors. Nevertheless, for this paper, the key thing to note is that, in Regime 1, both closed-end and open-end funds were allowed to amortize in this manner. We show later that given this level playing field between how fees could be charged and transparency, the open-end organization form dominated the closed-end form.
Regime 2: Framing Closed-End Versus Open-End Fund Fees Separately
To increase transparency on the total fees investors were being charged during the new offer period c. Since closed-ended schemes are allowed to charge initial issue expenses, they shall not charge entry load.
d. In close-ended schemes where initial issue expenses are amortised, for an investor exiting the scheme before amortisation is completed, AMC [Asset Management Company] shall redeem the units only after recovering the balance proportionate unamortised issue expenses.
e. Conversion of a closed-ended scheme or interval scheme to open-ended scheme/ or issuance of new units should be done only after the balance unamortised amount has been fully recovered from the scheme.
It is important to note that Part (d) eliminated the ability of closed-end funds to amortize initial issue expenses in such a way as to harm longer term investors. As described above, during Regime 1, both open and closed end funds could allow investors who exited their funds early to avoid paying their full proportion of the initial issue expenses. During Regime 2, a typical closedend fund would charge 6 percent as initial issue expenses and amortize them daily over the term of the closed end-fund (usually 3 years). Suppose again that a closed-end fund raised 1000 rupees by selling 100 shares and therefore had the right to collect .6 rupees in initial issue expenses per share. By amortizing the expenses, the closed-end fund would collect .2 rupees per each year in expenses, for a total of .6 rupees per share for the life of the closed-end fund. If an investor withdrew 500 rupees from the fund in the first year, this law change states that this investor would still be responsible for paying the full amount of initial issue expenses (30 rupees) that were owed on the shares that they owned.
Regime 3: Forcing Closed End Funds to Call Their Expenses Entry Loads
On January 31, 2008, the Indian stock market regulator SEBI announced that all closed-end mutual funds would no longer be allowed to charge up to 6 percent of money invested to cover issue expenses (SEBI Circular No. 11/115723/08). Closed-end funds would now have to call their initial expenses "entry loads" instead. The announcement stated:
Currently closed-ended schemes are permitted to charge initial issue expenses and not charge entry load. In order to bring more transparency and clarity to the investors in terms of the expenses charged to them in closed-ended schemes, SEBI Board in a recent meeting decided as under:
(1) Henceforth, there will be no provision of charging initial issue expense and amortization of the same.
(2) All mutual fund schemes shall now meet sales, marketing and other expenses connected with sales and distribution schemes from the entry load.
This circular would be applicable to all mutual fund schemes launched after the date of the circular. Table 1 to force open-ended funds to collect initial fees only through entry loads, and to force closed-end funds to collect entry fees only through amortizable initial issue expenses. In moving from Regime 2 to Regime 3, the only change was to force closed-end funds to charge entry loads instead of amortizable initial issue expenses.
Summary of Three Fund Pricing Regimes and Predictions
We wish to test whether the initial issue expenses were shrouded relative to entry fees. There are two reasons why entry-loads may be more transparent to investors than amortizable initial issue expenses. First, entry loads are deducted right at the time of the initial investment. When the investor receives his first statement, he will immediately realize that money has been taken out for the entry load. Because initial issue expenses were amortized over three years, the amounts removed for these costs are likely to have been hidden amongst market movements over time (Barber et al., 2005) . The second reason, which is likely a result of the first, is that Indian mutual fund companies show the entry load on the front page of the mutual fund offer document that distributors give to potential investors. If initial issue expenses are more shrouded than entry loads we expect the following:
• Regime 1: Because both open-end and closed-end funds could shroud initial issue expenses in this period, we expect determinants orthogonal to the types of fees charged to determine whether open versus closed-end funds are started.
• Regime 2: In this regime, closed-ended funds could charge the shrouded fees, whereas openended funds could not. Under the shrouding hypothesis, we expect the proportion of closedended funds issued to increase substantially during this period.
• Regime 3: In this regime, neither closed or open ended funds could charge the shrouded fees, so we expect the proportion of new funds started of this type to revert to levels observed during Regime 1.
Data
The Association of Mutual Funds in India (AMFI) issues monthly reports on mutual fund flows into nine major types of funds: (1) Income (2) Equity (3) Balanced (4) Liquid/Money Market (5) Gilt (Government Bonds) (6) Equity Linked Savings Schemes (ELSS) -Equity (7) Gold ETFs (8)
Other ETFs (9) Fund of Funds Investing Overseas. Each monthly report includes the number of new open and closed funds started and the total assets raised for each type of these funds. In this paper I only focus on equity, ELSS, and Balanced funds because these are the only classes of funds where retail investors make up a large proportion of asset holdings. ELSS funds are funds that have a mandatory three year lock-in period. Dividends on ELSS funds are not taxed and when the ELSS fund position is exited the investor pays long-term capital gains taxes. Balanced funds are funds that invest in both equities and debt. Approximately 65 percent of the assets under management in equity, ELSS, and Balanced funds come from retail investors, whereas only 4 percent of assets under management in income funds come from retail investors. 11 This is primarily because many of these income funds are owned by corporations that use them for cash management purposes. 12 13 The last column presents the average monthly return on the Bombay Sensex stock index in each year, which we will use as a control variable. As no centralized database of mutual fund fees exists in the Indian mutual fund sector, we collected this data by first creating a list of all the mutual funds created since 1993 from the "Scheme Details" section of the Association of Mutual Funds of India website. For each of the equity funds issued we searched online for their offer documents and copied the available fee information from there; if the offer document was not available, information from a variety of websites was used to track the characteristics of new fund offers. 14 We concentrate on funds that were started during Regimes 2 and 3 because the highest proportion of information for these funds is available on the internet. There were a total of 45 closed-end funds started during Regimes 2 and 3 and I was able to find the initial issue expenses charged for 29 of these. There were a total of 53 open-end funds started during Regimes 2 and 3, and we were able to find the entry loads charged for 52 of them.
There is also an important difference in the way funds reported initial issue expenses versus entry loads. For entry loads, the offer documents and websites clearly state what the entry load charged will be. For closed-end funds, however, 12 of the funds provide data on the initial issue expenses. The remaining 17 funds state "Initial Issue Expenses not exceeding 6% incurred by the Mutual Fund will be charged to the Scheme and will be amortised over a period of three years." Thus, for these 17 funds, it is possible that they eventually charged less than six percent in initial issue expenses. Of course, if the firm intended to charge less than six percent it would seem in its interest to state that they would charge a lower initial expense to gain a competitive advantage.
For clarity, we report summary statistics of fee levels charged for both those that estimated their initial issue expenses, and those that just gave an upper-bound on expenses.
2007).
13 I adjusted the raw data for inflation in India using the All Commodities Wholesale Price inflation rate taken from www.indiastat.com (Source: Ministry of Commerce & Industry, Govt. of India.) I then converted the 2009 rupees into 2009 U.S. dollars using the exchange rate of 46.235 rupees/dollar taken from finance.yahoo.in on November 17, 2009.
14 These websites are typically blogs run by mutual fund distributors used to advertise new mutual funds.
Results

Illustrative Figures
Before presenting regression based evidence, I present graphs which illustrate the main results. The net flows figures corroborates the pattern in the starts and inflows data; in other words, it does not appear that dramatic rise in inflows to closed-end funds was somehow undone by outflows.
The hand-collected data on initial issue expenses and entry loads shows that closed-end funds estimated their initial issue expenses at 6 percent, whereas open-ended funds charged an average of 1.75 percent in entry loads. The remaining closed-end funds did not precisely indicate their initial issue expenses, instead stating they would charge up to 6 percent in initial issue expenses. Figure 5 plots the fee charged for all of the funds with data and shows that open-end funds charged between 0 and 3 percent entry loads during Regimes 2 and 3, with the majority of funds charging 2.25 percent. No closed-end fund estimated it would charge less than 6 percent in initial issue expenses.
If investors were truly willing to pay extra expenses for access to closed-end equity funds during Regime 2 then they would have been willing to pay extra to access closed-end funds during Regime 3. Yet based on the results here it appears that mutual fund investors would not have
15 As a reference, Figure 4 plots the Bombay Sensex Index over this same period. 16 In the case of one fund, the "Sundaram BNP Paribas Select Thematic Funds -Entertainment Opportunities" I found an initial offer document stating that the fund would be a closed end fund. However, the fund actually debuted as an open-ended fund on May 24, 2008. Interestingly, it appears that the fund company changed this specific fund from closed to open-ended when it was no longer possible to charge the amortized issue expenses. paid the higher "issue expenses" of closed-end funds once mutual fund companies were forced to disclose them as entry-loads. In other words, by re-framing those issue expenses as entry loads it appears that closed-end equity funds were forced to compete with open-ended equity funds, and in the investors' eyes they were not a good enough product to warrant the extra expense.
Regression Evidence on Mutual Fund Starts and Flows
To identify the effect of the law change 1 and law change 2 I use a difference-in-difference approach.
I test whether the number of closed-end funds started and the amount of flows into closed-end funds was statistically different during Regime 2 relative to fund starts and flows to open-end funds. I use the regression specification:
Each observation represents a type of fund i ∈ {Closed,Open} in month*year t. S it is the number of funds started or the amount of money (in 2009 millions US$) of fund type i in month*year t. For example in June 2007 two open-ended funds were started. Return t−1 is the return on the Bombay Sensex index for one month prior to t. 17 R2 it is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for months during Regime 2 and 0 for all other months. Closed i is a dummy that takes the value of one for observations that represents starts or amounts for closed end funds, and takes the value 0 for observations that represent starts or amounts for open-end funds. Our main prediction is that β 4 > 0. If investors are not cognizant of the higher initial issue expenses charged by closed-end funds then we should expect mutual fund companies to start more closed-end funds during this period and for money to flow into them, and for this increase to be larger than the increase that occurs for open-ended funds during Regime 2. Table 3 presents these results. Columns (1) and (2) Column (2) restricts the sample to only include the periods 22 months before Regime 2 began and 20 months after Regime 2 ended. There are 64 observations of closed-end starts and flows (22 before Regime 2, 22 during Regime 2, and 20 after Regime 2 18 ). We report these results because using a shorter window around Regime 2 yields better comparison groups than including all of the observations in Column (1). The results in Column (2) are consistent with those in Column (1).
Columns (3) and (4) report the same specifications as Columns (1) and (2), however the dependent variable is the amount of funds flowing into fund type i in month*year t. These results confirm that the amounts flowing into closed-end funds during Regime 2 were significantly higher than the commensurate increase in funds flowing to open-ended funds during Regime 2. In Column (3) the coefficient on the Regime2*Closed dummy is not statistically significant at the 10 percent level; however, the p-value is .148 which is close to the 10 percent significant level. When I restrict the sample to the shorter event window in Column (4) As an alternative specification we test whether the fraction of monies that flows into new closed-ended equity funds responded significantly to the new framing of fund fees in Regime 2 relative to Regimes 1 and Regime 3. I test this using the following regression specification:
where j indexes a type of fund ∈ {Equity, ELSS, Balanced} and t indexes a month-year (e.g.
June 2006). F C jt is the fraction of money going into new fund offers of closed-end equity funds
versus open-ended equity funds. I include a dummy variable to signify Regime 2, R2 jt , which is equal to 1 during Regime 2 when closed-end funds were allowed to charge the separate "shrouded" (1) shows that the proportion of funds flowing into closed-ended equity funds is 43 percentage points higher during Regime 2, and that this difference is significant at the 1 percent level. Column (2) includes a control a for the lagged 1 period return on the Sensex index, which is a value-weighted index of the largest 30 firms (by market-capitalization) on the Bombay Stock Exchange. Columns (3) and (4) replicate these results including additional fund classes that are overall much smaller than the income and equity classes.
I include balanced funds which primarily hold equities and ELSSequity funds that are primarily tax-savings vehicles and also primarily hold equities. I categorize all of these as "equity" funds because they have similar levels of retail participation as the main equity funds. The results in Columns (3) and (4) are very similar to those in Columns (1) and (2). We first discuss why the transition from Regime 1 to Regime 2 did not impose a lower pricecap on open-end funds versus closed-end funds. Regime 2 allowed open-end funds to charge up to a six percent entry load and allowed closed-end funds to charge up to six percent in initial issue expenses. The only meaningful difference between these two types of fees is that initial issue expenses could be amortized over three years, whereas entry loads were required to be collected upfront. Given that amortizing fees makes it possible to collect lower fees (in terms of present value), there is no reason to believe that open-end funds were prohibited from charging higher fees than closed-end funds. Thus the transition from Regime 1 to Regime 2 did not involve the imposition of lower price ceilings for open-ended funds. In the transition from Regime 2 to Regime 3, closed-end funds were forced to charge entry loads instead of initial issue expenses. Again, this change did not impose a price-cap on closed-ended funds because being allowed to charge six percent in entry loads (Regime 3) was at least as generous as charging six percent in initial issue expenses in Regime 2.
There is also no evidence to suggest that the price ceiling on operating expenses that closed versus open ended funds could charge changed around the same time that law changes studied here changed.
Demand for Amortization vs. Entry Loads
Another possible explanation for the growth in closed-ended funds over this period is that investors may have a strong preference to amortize their entry fees over a period of time. The only difference between between initial issue expenses where amortization is allowed and entry loads where amortization is not allowed is that, under amortization, the present value of fees is lower because fees are paid in the future. If investors' discount rates were high enough, then forcing open-ended funds to charge entry loads instead of initial issue expenses could have made closed-end funds very attractive during Regime 2.
One way to determine whether this story is plausible is to calculate how high the discount rates of the people who purchased closed-end funds would have to have been to justify paying 6 percent fees over time versus 2.25 percent fees up front. Typically closed-end funds during Regime 2 were either three or five year terms. For a three year closed-end fund, we calculate that an individual would have to have a discount rate of approximately 224 percent per year to prefer a closed-end fund with initial issue expenses of six percent amortized over three years, versus an open-end fund with an entry load of 2.25 percent. For a five year closed-end fund, we calculate that an individual would have to have a discount rate of 163 percent per year to prefer a closed-end fund that had initial issue expenses of six percent versus an open-end fund that had an entry load of 2.25 percent. 19 The main reason discount rates would have to be so large is that the term of the closed-end funds offered was not long enough for any reasonable discount rate to make a difference in the present value of fees. Accordingly it seems extremely unlikely that rational discounting can explain why disallowing closed-end funds to charge initial issue expenses and forcing them to charge entry loads led to the demise of the equity closed-end fund market. an open-ended fund, in the short run, the fund will be forced to unwind the position if clients make short-run redemptions. A closed-end fund, however, has less obligations to make redemptions and so can maintain the long-run arbitrage position until it pays off. Stein (2005) focuses on the standard variant of closed-end funds where investors can only redeem their money by selling on a 19 These calculations are done numerically using the present value of an annuity formula to calculate the present value of fees for 100 rupees invested in a closed-end fund equal to the 2.25 rupees an investor would pay as an entry load on an open-ended fund. why this is unlikely to explain the emergence of closed-end funds during Regime 2. Based on the record of regulations issued by SEBI there were no policy changes during this period that were instituted and then un-instituted during Regime 2. It also seems unlikely that investors somehow gained better monitoring technology on their own during Regime 2 and then somehow lost this monitoring technology during Regime 3. Second, the Indian closed-end funds offered substantial liquidity because they had pre-specified periods when investors could redeem at NAV. For the 22
Other Theoretical Determinants of Closed vs. Open Ended Funds
(out of 45) closed-end funds where data was available 5 offered daily redemption, 2 offered weekly redemption, 9 offered monthly redemption, 2 offered quarterly redemption, and 3 offered half-yearly redemption. Given that the majority of closed-end funds during Regime 2 had frequent redemption, it seems unlikely demands for limited liquidity explain the importance of closed-end funds during Regime 2.
Did Closed-End Fund Investors Get Higher Returns?
Another possible alternative explanation for the emergence of closed-end funds during Regime 2 is that the closed-end funds on the market during this period offered higher returns, and thus investors found it worthwhile to pay higher fees for these funds. In this section we calculate the returns earned by both closed and open ended funds offered during this period before entry and initial expense fees (but including operating expenses which are the same for all funds we study). additional 4 funds, the NAV data was truncated, i.e. the NAV data was not consistently reported on the AMFI website. We include the returns on these four funds along with the 97 funds for which I have complete NAV data in our return calculations.
The net-asset values reported for open-end funds do not include the entry load paid by the investor. The amortization of fees for closed-end funds is built into the net asset values, so to obtain pre-fee returns we need to add back in the fees the investor is paying through the declining net asset value in a closed-end fund. Suppose a closed-end fund charged six percent in initial issue expenses and an investor purchased one unit at 10 rupees during the new fund offer period. This investor would then owe the fund .06 rupees as initial issue expenses. This .06 rupees would be taken out of the assets of the fund in equal pieces over all of the trading days over the first three years of the fund. In the case where the investor withdrew the money before the end of the first three years, the balance of initial issue expenses owed to the fund company would be withdrawn.
We assume that there were 750 trading days over the first three years of the closed-end fund. Thus, for each trading day .06/750 = .0008 rupees per day is added to the reported daily NAV of the closed-end funds. This adjusts the data so the returns we calculate do not include the effects of the initial issue expenses.
To control for aggregate market movements, we subtract the returns of the Bombay Sensex index from the raw calculated net returns over the period the particular fund existed. We find that, after adjusting for these aggregate returns, closed-end funds had an average monthly return of - Based on these calculations, it does not appear that closed-end funds offered higher returns commensurate with the greater fees they charged; in fact, we find that open-ended funds performed slightly better over this period. In addition, closed-end funds also offered less liquidity in that money could only be withdrawn at set intervals. This evidence suggests that closed-end fund investors did not receive higher returns commensurate with the substantially larger fees.
Conclusion
We present new evidence on the importance of shrouded fund fees using a natural experiment in the Indian mutual fund industry. When closed-end funds could charge amortized fees, which are plausibly more shrouded than entry loads, many closed-end funds were established in a short time-frame.
Forcing closed-end funds to charge entry loads effectively curtailed their growth. We calculate that Indian investors spent approximately 500 million dollars in fees due to this shrouding. In light of the recent experimental literature that finds many framing manipulations to be unsuccessful in changing investor fund choices, the "un-shrouding" reform studied here appears to have had large (4) and (5) represent ELSS Funds, and Columns (7) and (8) Fama and French(1993) . 6 month yield of India Treasury bill was used for risk-free rate and BSE Sensex Index was used as a proxy for wealth return. India market mimicking portfolios are formed in January of year t,
2004∼2010
. Size factor SM B (small minus big) was constructed using market capitalization of January, year t.
Book-to-market factor HM L (high minus low) was constructed using book-value of fiscal year ending in April, year t − 1 .
Market value of t − 1 was used to calculate the ratio of book value and market value. At every January, we divide India BSE listed companies into 2 size categories and 3 book-to-market ratio categories. Value-weighted returns of each categories are used to calculate size factor SM B = 
Appendix
In this appendix, we explain briefly the procedure of constructing the Indian stock market mimicking portfolio as in Fama and French (1992) and Fama and French (1993) .
We use nonfinancial firms listed on the Indian Bombay Stock Exchange(BSE) from FactSet
Research Systems Inc. 21 Data for stock price, book-value and shares outstanding were retrieved for April 2006 through February 2010. We exclude financial firms from the analysis because leverage for nonfinancial firms may imply a different corporate situation from that of financial firms. For constructing the size factor (SM B) and book-to-market ratio factor (HM L) in India stock market, we follow closely Fama and French (1992, 1993) 's procedure for market-mimicking portfolio construction.
Market-equity (M E) is used to measure a firm's size, which is calculated as stock price multiplied by shares outstanding. For assessing a firm's size, we use market-equity at the end of January at year t. In order to ensure accounting information is reflected in stock price, we match accounting data for fiscal year that ends in calendar year t − 1 with stock price data for calendar year t. To compute book-to-market ratio, we use firm's market-equity at the end of January at year t − 1.
At every January, we sort firms into two size categories (Big and Small) and 3 book-to-market categories (High, Median, Low) according to its market equity and book-to-market ratio. Median and 30% /70% percentile are used as break points for size sorting and book-to-market ratio sorting.
After assigning one of six categories (B/L, B/M, B/H, S/L, S/M, S/H) to every firm, we calculate monthly return for each firm in each category. Then we calculate value-weighted return of firms' return at each category. Size factor SMB is calculated as a weighted sum of small companies' return minus big companies' return. Note that the frequency of return data is monthly but a company's category may change annually each January.
